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MELVIN EUGENE SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 940580-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1995) and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a second-degree felony, in violation of § 76-10-503 
(1995). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does defendant's brief present sufficient legal argument and citation so as to 
comply with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
Because this is a question of appellate procedure there is no lower court ruling to 
review. "When an appellant's argument contains no citations to the record and no legal 
authority, and as such does not comply with the briefing rules, [the appellate court 
should] decline to reach those issues." State v. Garza. 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 
1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
All relevant provisions will be reproduced within the argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 29, 1994, after a day-and-a-half trial, a jury convicted Melvin Eugene 
Smith of aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-203 (1995), and possession of a weapon by a restricted person, a second-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995) (R. 188). This same day 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the prosecution had failed to comply 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1995) (R. 154). On May 2, 1994, the trial court 
denied the motion to dismiss (R. 179-183). The court later sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate five years to life term for the aggravated burglary conviction, and one-to 
fifteen-years for the possession charge (R. 188). The trial judge ordered the sentences 
to run concurrently (R. 187). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 16, 1994, Troy Thomas, an employee of the Albertsons' store located at 
2255 North, University Parkway in Provo, saw defendant in an upstairs office (Tr. 52, 
54, 59). When he went to the office to investigate, defendant drew a gun and told 
Thomas to give him the money (Tr. 59-60). Soon thereafter another employee entered 
the office and defendant ordered both her and Thomas to get down on the floor and 
count to fifty while he left (R. 62). Several other employees and customers saw 
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defendant hastily leave the store and saw the license plate number of the car in which 
he drove away (Tr. 93, 96, 108, 120, 127, 131, 135). Later that day the police 
determined that the car was registered in the defendant's name (Tr. 163). After 
learning this, the police assembled a photographic spread and showed it to three 
witnesses (Preliminary Hearing, 73-74). Two of the witnesses identified defendant 
from the photo line-up (id.). The next day, July 17, police arrested the defendant 
(Preliminary Hearing, 75). 
On October 18, 1993, defendant sent a petition for a 120-day disposition to the 
Utah County Public Defenders Association (R. 181). The association wrote a letter to 
June Hinckley, the Records and I.D. Officer at the Utah State Prison, on October 27, 
1993, stating that it was forwarding the petition to her (id.). In response to the letter, 
Ms. Hinckley sent a form notice to defendant on November 15, 1993, for purposes of 
filing his 120-day request (id.) Defendant signed the form on November 18, 1993, and 
Ms. Hinckley received it on December 7, 1993 (id.). She then sent a copy to the 
prosecuting attorney, but not the court clerk (id.). 
Defendant's original trial date was set for November 9, 1993 (R. 180). On 
November 5, 1993, the prosecutor motioned the court to continue the trial because she 
could not locate an essential witness (R. 180, 23, 21). In an affidavit to the court, 
Sergeant Toby O'Bryant stated that the witness, who was in the car with the defendant 
at the time of the incident, refused to speak to him under advice of defendant's counsel, 
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and that she informed him that she was in the process of moving (R. 20-21). Sergeant 
O'Bryant made efforts to locate her, but was unable to find her in the vicinity of the 
location to which she said she was moving (id.). Defendant objected to the motion for 
continuance, but the court found good cause and continued the trial to February 7, 1994 
(R. 180). On February 2, 1994, the prosecution again presented a motion for a 
continuance because an essential witness would be out of the state (id.). The defendant 
did not object to the continuance, but requested trial as soon as possible (R. 179-80). 
The court found good cause and granted the continuance, moving the trial to March 28, 
1994 (R. 179). The court noted that its calender was composed of criminal trials from 
February 2, 1994 to March 28, 1994, and that there were no civil matters to bump, 
thereby leaving March 28, 1994, the earliest date the trial could be rescheduled (R. 
id.). On March 13, 1994, the prosecutor filed another motion for continuance because 
the chief investigator was going to be out of town (R. 53). The court denied the motion 
(R. 54). 
The trial was held on March 28, 1994, 110 days after Ms. Hinckley received 
official notice of defendant's petition for 120-day disposition on December 7, 1993 (R. 
181). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should dismiss defendant's appeal because his brief does not comply 
with rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL LEGAL 
CITATION OR ANALYSIS RENDERS THIS COURT UNABLE TO 
REVIEW ANY OF THE ISSUES WHICH HE ASSERTS ON THIS 
APPEAL 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, expressly requires that a brief 
include an argument containing "the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on." As a matter of settled appellate practice, failure to support 
assertions of error with proper argument forecloses consideration on appeal. Utah R. 
App. P. 24(j) (stating that briefs which are not in compliance with rule 24 may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sea sponte by the court); State v. Wareham. 772 
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (rejecting defense argument for lack of legal analysis); State 
v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (same); State v. Garza. 820 P.2d 937, 
939 (Utah App. 1991) (holding appellate court would decline to examine issues that are 
not supported by citations to the record or legal authority); State v. Reiners. 803 P.2d 
1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to rule on a sufficiency of the evidence 
argument that contained "no citations to authority and only vague reasoning"). 
Defendant's first argument, that he was not prosecuted within 120 days as 
required by section 77-29-1, contains only two citations to legal case authority and fails 
to relate the significance of these cases to the facts of the current appeal. Br. Of 
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Defendant at 6-7. Similarly, defendant offers only broad assertions and vague 
reasoning as to whether good cause existed for a continuance of the trial and provides 
no legal citations in support of his argument.1 Br. Of Defendant at 7. This omission is 
fatal to the defendant's brief. 
Defendant's second argument, ineffectiveness of trial counsel, also fails to 
provide meaningful legal analysis or citation. Defendant cites only Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), for the proposition that defendant's trial 
counsel was ineffective. Yet, defendant makes no reference to the two-prong test 
which Strickland established for ineffectiveness claims, i.e, that counsel's performance 
fell below a standard of objective reasonableness and that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. M, See also State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 
1994) (applying Strickland test). Instead, defendant offers only vague arguments as to 
why trial counsel was ineffective and how this ineffectiveness prejudiced the defendant 
1
 Response to defendant's arguments takes a two-prong inquiry. If Dec. 7, 1993, is the 
date considered operative for the 120 day notice, then only 110 days passed before defendant's trial 
began on March 28, 1994, and the trial occurred within the appropriate time. If instead, October 27, 
1993, the date Ms. Hinckley received notice from the Utah County Public Defender's Association, is 
the operative date, then defendant must show why the trial court's determination of good cause for 
granting a continuance was erroneous. This entails a showing that the trial court's finding of good 
cause was an abuse of discretion. £g£ State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah 1991) (holding 
that trial courts have discretion in finding good cause for a continuance in 120-day disposition case); 
State v. Trujillo. 656 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982) (stating discretion is vested in the trial court in these 
matters); State v. Mathis. 319 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah 1957) (holding that a "request for a continuance is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trail court and unless there is plain abuse its ruling will not be 
disturbed"). Defendant makes no argument as to why the trial court abused its discretion, nor even any 
argument as to why there was not good cause for the continuance. 
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with no citation to any authority which would support his position. Br. of Defendant at 
8-9. 
Finally, defendant cites no cases or legal authority in support of his insufficiency 
of the evidence argument. When attacking the sufficiency of the evidence a defendant 
must first marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and must then show how 
this evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d 470, 
472 (Utah App. 1991). Defendant fails to meet either of these requirements. In a case 
presenting similar issues, State v. Reiners. 803 P.2d 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990), 
this Court declined to rule on an insufficiency claim where no meaningful legal 
argument or citation was made. Because defendant's arguments contain no meaningful 
or significant citations to authority and only vague reasoning, his brief should be 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should dismiss defendant's appeal, because of dc^ndant's failure to 
comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
The State does not request either oral argument or a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 # W of July, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or 
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names 
of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, 
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim 
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone 
will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a 
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the 
brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part 
of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of 
the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document 
subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. 
The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company 
ADDENDUM B 
810 P.2d421 
(Cite as: 810 P.2d 421) 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bryon Dale PETERSEN, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 900180. 
Supreme Court of Utal*. 
April 4, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted by jury of aggravated 
burglary, and two counts of attempted second-
degree murder, before the Seventh District Court, 
Emery County, Boyd Bunnell, J., and court 
subsequently found defendant guilty of being 
habitual offender. Defendant appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that reversal of 
defendant's convictions was required due to failure 
of State to bring defendant to trial within 120 days 
of date of delivery of written notice of disposition, 
and fact that there was no good cause for the delay. 
Reversed, charges dismissed. 
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <&=> 1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) 
Questions of law are reviewed by the Supreme Court 
for correctness. 
[2] CRIMINAL LAW &=> 577.10(10) 
110k577.10(10) 
Defendant who files notice of disposition is not 
required to object to trial date in order to maintain 
his rights under statute requiring defendant to have 
charge brought to trial within 120 days of date of 
delivery of written notice of disposition. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3, 4). 
[3] CRIMINAL LAW <©^  577.10(4) 
110k577.10(4) 
Trial court's decision not to dismiss for failure to 
begin proceeding within 120 days after filing of 
notice of disposition and its decision to grant 
continuance are based on findings of good cause, 
and thus same standard of review should be applied. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
52(a). 
[3] CRIMINAL LAW &=> 1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) 
Trial court's decision not to dismiss for failure to 
begin proceeding within 120 days after filing of 
notice of disposition and its decision to grant 
continuance are based on findings of good cause, 
and thus same standard of review should be applied. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
52(a). 
[4] CRIMINAL LAW <S^ 1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) 
Legal determinations concerning proper 
interpretation of statute which grants trial court 
discretion are reviewed for correctness. 
[5] CRIMINAL LAW <S=> 1158(1) 
HOkl 158(1) 
Trial court's factual determinations will not be 
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 
[6] CRIMINAL LAW G=> 577.16(8) 
110k577.16(8) 
Defendants who are not brought to trial within 120 
days of filing of notice of disposition have no 
burden of proving that they were prejudiced by 
delay or that prosecution was given tactical 
advantage to be entitled to dismissal of charges. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. 
[7] CRIMINAL LAW <§=> 577.16(5.1) 
110k577.16(5.1) 
Formerly 110k5771/4(5) 
There was no reasonable continuance granted to toll 
statutory period for bringing of case to trial after 
notice of disposition was filed; neither of the 
attorneys nor defendant requested or was granted 
continuance. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3). 
[8] CRIMINAL LAW <S=> 577.10(4) 
110k577.10(4) 
Good cause for failing to hold hearing within 120 
days of inmate's filing of notice of disposition 
cannot be based on mere fact that delay was not 
caused by prosecutor. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-
29-1(3, 4). 
[9] CRIMINAL LAW <§=> 577.10(3) 
110k577.10(3) 
Delay in bringing inmate to trial within 120 days of 
his filing of notice of disposition was not reasonable 
for specific purpose of allowing defendant and his 
counsel time to resolve their conflicts; trial judge 
did not feel that delay was necessary to resolve 
conflict 34 days before date of trial when 
Copr. ° West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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defendant's counsel sought to withdraw due to 
continuing conflict, but rather court appointed 
cocounsel and did not continue trial. U.C.A.1953, 
77-29-1,77-29-1(3,4). 
•422 Keith H. Chiara, Price, and Allen S. 
Thorpe, Castle Dale, for defendant and appellant. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and appellee. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Bryon Dale Petersen appeals his 
convictions of aggravated burglary, [FN1] a first 
degree felony; of two counts of attempted second 
degree murder, [FN2] both second degree felonies; 
[FN3] and of being a habitual criminal. [FN4] 
FN1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1) (Supp.1989). 
FN2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(a) 
(Supp.1989). 
FN3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989). 
FN4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp.1989). 
On July 6, 1989, Petersen was charged with 
burglarizing the home of Ms. Lola Jewkes and 
attempting to murder Ms. Jewkes and her daughter. 
Petersen, having been previously convicted and 
sentenced to prison for felony offenses, at least one 
of which was a second degree felony, was also 
charged with possession of a firearm by a prohibited 
person [FN5] and with being a habitual criminal. 
On July 12, 1989, Petersen, who was being held at 
the Utah State Prison pending a parole revocation 
hearing, filed a notice and request for disposition of 
pending charges ("notice of disposition"), pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (Supp.1989). The 
notice of disposition was filed with an authorized 
agent of the Utah State Prison. Section 77-29-1(2) 
requires that any custodial officer, upon receipt of a 
notice of disposition, "shall immediately cause the 
demand to be forwarded ... to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Section 77-
29-1(1) states that a prisoner is "entitled to have the 
charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date 
of delivery of written notice." The Emery County 
Attorney received a copy of the notice of 
disposition. However, for unknown reasons, no 
copy of the notice was found in the trial court's file. 
FN5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp.1989). 
On July 27, 1989, the Emery County Public 
Defender was appointed to represent Petersen. 
Petersen was arraigned on September 6, 1989, and 
at the arraignment, requested that the court appoint 
different counsel because of Petersen's 
dissatisfaction with the public defender's handling of 
his case. Petersen's request for new counsel was 
denied, and without objection, trial was set for 
February 15, 1990, 218 days after Petersen filed the 
notice of disposition. 
On January 5, 1990, Petersen's appointed counsel 
sought to withdraw from the case, claiming that he 
was not able to resolve continuing conflicts with his 
client. On January 12, 1990, the trial judge denied 
the motion to withdraw and appointed co-counsel. 
When Petersen's new defense counsel learned that 
Petersen had filed a notice of disposition, a motion 
to dismiss was filed on the ground that Petersen was 
not brought to trial within 120 days of the delivery 
of the notice. On February 15, 1990, a hearing was 
held and the motion to dismiss was denied. 
In dismissing the motion, the trial court found: 
(1) The county attorney had received the notice of 
disposition, but the court had received no notice 
whatsoever. (2) The court asked Petersen whether 
the trial date was acceptable, and Petersen did not 
object to the date. (3) The trial date was set to 
allow time for defendant and his counsel to resolve 
their differences. (4) Petersen, as a result of having 
his parole *423 revoked, has been incarcerated in 
the Utah State Prison since the filing of the charges. 
In its conclusions of law, the trial court ruled: (1) 
The setting of the trial date for February 15, 1990, 
occurred within the 120-day period and was for the 
purpose of allowing time for Petersen and his 
counsel to resolve their differences and, therefore, 
constituted a continuance for good cause. (2) 
Petersen waived the statutory right to a trial within 
120 days by not objecting to the trial date. (3) 
Petersen had the burden of showing that the failure 
to try his case before the expiration of the statutory 
period resulted in prejudice to his case or tactical 
advantage to the prosecutor. (4) Petersen made no 
showing of prejudice or tactical advantage. (5) The 
delay was not caused by any action or inaction of 
the prosecutor. 
Copr. ° West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works 
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On February 15, 1990, the date of the trial, 
Petersen moved to disqualify the trial judge on the 
ground that the judge had previously, as a district 
attorney, prosecuted defendant and had recused 
himself from presiding over a trial of defendant in 
December of 1981. The court denied this motion on 
the ground that it was not timely made. 
The aggravated burglary charge and the two 
attempted murder charges were tried to a jury on 
February 15 and 16. The jury returned a verdict of 
guilty on all counts. Following the verdict, 
defendant waived a jury trial on the charge of being 
a habitual criminal. The court subsequently found 
defendant guilty of this charge. The charge of 
unauthorized possession of a handgun was 
dismissed. Petersen was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years nor 
more than life on each one of the four charges, such 
terms to run consecutively. 
There are three issues presented on appeal. First, 
Petersen claims that all his convictions should be 
reversed and all charges dismissed with prejudice 
due to the State's failure to bring him to trial within 
120 days of the date on which the notice of 
disposition was delivered to the county attorney. 
Second, Petersen claims that if this court does not 
dismiss the charges, he is entitled to a new trial on 
the grounds of bias and prejudice on the part of the 
trial judge. Third, the State, on its own motion, 
asserts that Petersen was improperly sentenced and 
asks that the case be remanded for resentencing. 
[FN6] 
FN6. See State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1374 
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071, 
1074 (Utah 1989); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 
144-45 (Utah 1989) (all holding that the habitual 
criminal statute does not create a separate crime but 
operates as an enhancing statute); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (Supp.1989) (second 
degree murder is a first degree felony); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989) (attempted second 
degree murder is a second degree felony); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (Supp.1989) (second 
degree felony is punishable by an indeterminate 
period of not less than one nor more than fifteen 
years). 
Petersen's claim that his convictions should be 
reversed and the charges against him dismissed with 
prejudice is based on section 77-29-1, [FN7] which 
reads in pertinent part: 
FN7. Petersen does not claim that his constitutional 
rights to a speedy trial were violated. See U.S. 
Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The 
right afforded by the Utah Constitution is also 
guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(f) 
(Supp.1989). 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of 
imprisonment in the state prison ... and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any 
untried indictment or information, and the 
prisoner shall cause to be delivered to the warden 
... or any appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the charge and 
the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the charge, he shall be entitled to 
have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of 
the date of delivery of written notice. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required 
in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the 
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being 
present, may be granted any reasonable 
continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial 
within 120 days, or within *424 such continuance 
as has been granted, and the defendant or his 
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court 
shall review the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have 
the matter heard within the time required is not 
supported by gooc cause, whether a previous 
motion for continuance was made or not, the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
[1] The threshold issue, in determining whether 
Petersen's convictions should be reversed pursuant 
to section 77-29-1, is whether the trial court erred in 
ruling that Petersen waived his rights under the 
statute by not objecting to the trial date. Whether 
criminal defendants, after filing notices of 
disposition, are required to affirmatively assert their 
rights under section 77-29-1 is a question of 
statutory construction and, therefore, a question of 
law. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. 
[FN8] 
FN8. E.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 
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P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction 
is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 
P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is 
a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness). 
[2] This court has held that criminal defendants 
have no such duty to object under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-65-1 to -2 (Supp.1953) (amended 1980), the 
predecessor to section 77-29-1. [FN9] In so 
holding, we stated, "[I]t is apparent that the 
legislature intended to place the burden of 
complying with the statute, on the prosecutor." 
[FN 10] The language in section 77-29-1 compels 
the same conclusion. Section 77-29-1(4) states, "If 
the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting 
attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is not supported by good cause ... the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." 
[FN 11] This language clearly places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecutor. 
Therefore, Petersen, after filing his notice of 
disposition, was not required to object to the trial 
date in order to maintain his rights under section 77-
29-1. 
FN9. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 
158, 160 (1969). 
FN10. Id. 
FN11. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (emphasis 
added). 
[3] Since Petersen did not waive his rights, the 
determination of whether his convictions should be 
reversed is dependent on whether, in accordance 
with section 77-29-1(3), a "reasonable continuance" 
was granted for "good cause shown" or whether, in 
accordance with section 77-29-1(4), the trial judge 
properly found that the "failure of the prosecuting 
attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is supported by good cause." Before 
reaching these questions, however, it is important to 
note that we have interpreted both section 77-29-1 
and its predecessor as granting discretion to the trial 
court. [FN12] Specifically, in State v. Bonny 
[FN13] we held that sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) 
(amended 1980) granted trial courts the authority to 
make reasonable determinations concerning the 
existence of good cause. 
FN12. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 
1982) (per curiam) (interpreting section 77-29-1); 
State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147, 
147-48 (1970) (interpreting section 77-65-1). 
FN13. 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970). 
"[F]or a good cause shown in open court ... the 
court having jurisdiction in the matter may grant 
any necessary or reasonable continuance." The 
emphasized language of the statute just quoted 
makes it clear that if there is a reasonable basis in 
the record to support the proposition that the trial 
court granted a continuance "for good cause 
shown" it was within [the trial court's] discretion 
and authority to do so. [FN14] 
FN14. Id., 477 P.2d at 147-48 (emphasis in 
original). 
In stating this standard of review, the court relied 
on language that is consonant with the language of 
section 77-29-1(3); accordingly, the same standard 
should apply to the present statute. Although the 
predecessor to section 77-29-1 did not have a 
provision parallel to section 77-29-1(4), the decision 
not to dismiss under section *425 77-29-1(4) is 
based on a finding of "good cause," as is the 
decision to grant a continuance under section 77-29-
1(3). Therefore, the same standard of review should 
be applied to both subsections 77-29-1(3) and (4). 
[FN15] 
FN15. See State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405. 
[4] [5] Before reviewing the record to determine if 
there is a reasonable basis for the trial court's 
judgment, however, it is necessary to make primary 
determinations concerning the content of the record. 
It is to be noted that trial courts do not have 
discretion to misapply the law. [FN 16] Therefore, 
legal determinations concerning the proper 
interpretation of the statute which grants the trial 
court discretion are reviewed for correctness. 
[FN 17] Similarly, the trial court's factual 
determinations will not be disturbed unless clearly 
erroneous. [FN 18] It is only after these primary 
determinations are made that the record can be 
reviewed for the existence of a reasonable basis for 
the proposition that good cause existed for the 
continuance or the delay. 
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FN16. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772 
(1962); 4 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 111 (1957). 
FN 17. See Hancock v. Planned Development 
Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) (trial court 
does not have discretion to grant new trial absent 
one of the grounds specified in the rule); Tangaro 
v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390, 391 n. 
2 (1964) (trial court does not have discretion to 
grant new trial absent one of the grounds specified 
in the rule); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772 
(1962) (trial court has no discretion to misapply the 
law); 4 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 111 (1957) (trial 
court has no discretion on question of own power); 
see also, e.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction 
is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 
933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness). 
See generally State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 
P.2d 158, 160 (1969) (supreme court interprets 
sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) (amended 1980) and 
grants no deference to trial court's ruling). 
FN18. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Sweeney Land 
Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990). 
[6] The record supports the trial court's factual 
findings. In its conclusions of law, however, the 
trial court erred in rulings concerning the correct 
interpretation and application of section 77-29-1. 
Specifically, the trial court ruled that under section 
77-29-1, Petersen had the burden of proving that the 
delay prejudiced his case or gave the prosecution a 
tactical advantage. Although the fact that the delay 
works to the disadvantage of a defendant may be a 
reason for not finding "good cause," nothing in 
section 77-29-1, its predecessor, or any of the case 
law under either statute requires a showing of 
prejudice in order for the charges against a 
defendant to be dismissed. On the contrary, section 
77-29-1 clearly provides that if there is not good 
cause for the delay, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed. The statute makes no mention of the 
effect of the delay. The only support the State cites 
for the trial court's position is a case dealing with 
the constitutional right to a speedy trial. [FN 19] 
However, we have never used the same approach in 
cases decided under section 77-29-1 or its 
predecessor as we have used in constitutional cases. 
[FN20] The conclusion that Petersen did not carry 
his burden of showing prejudice, therefore, cannot 
be used to support the finding of good cause. 
FN19. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1327-31 
(Utah 1986). 
FN20. See State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 
P.2d 274, 276 (1972) (rights under section 77-65-2 
(amended 1980) are distinct from constitutional 
rights to speedy trial). 
[7] It is also to be noted that the trial court erred 
in ruling that a reasonable continuance was granted 
tolling the statutory period. Section 77-29-1(3) sets 
out requirements that must be met before trial 
judges, in their discretion, may grant continuances 
that toll the time in which a defendant must be tried 
under section 77-29-1. This section provides that 
"the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his 
counsel ... may be granted any reasonable 
continuance.M It is clear from the record that neither 
of the attorneys nor defendant requested or was 
granted a continuance. The requirements of the 
statute not being *426 met, the trial court erred in 
concluding that a continuance was granted under 
section 77-29-1(3). 
This fact, however, is not fatal to State's case. 
Section 77-29-1(4) states that if a motion to dismiss 
is brought, the trial court shall review the 
proceedings. "If the court finds that the failure of 
the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by good 
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance 
was made or not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice." This language makes it 
clear that it is the finding of good cause that is 
dispositive and not the actual granting of a 
continuance. The court did find that there was good 
cause for the delay in that the trial was set to allow 
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve their 
differences. The finding of good cause is also 
supported by the court's conclusion that the delay 
was not caused by an action or inaction of the 
prosecutor. 
[8] As the State points out, this court has upheld 
trial court findings of good cause that were 
supported, at least in part, by the fact that the delay 
was not caused by action or inaction of the 
prosecutor. [FN21] However, this factor alone has 
never been considered dispositive. In the past, we 
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have reversed a trial court's decision not to dismiss, 
notwithstanding the fact that the delay was not 
caused by the prosecutor. [FN22] Furthermore, in 
the cases cited by the State, there are other reasons 
for the finding of good cause, such as a request on 
the part of the defense for a continuance [FN23] 
and/or a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen 
problems arising immediately prior to trial. [FN24] 
In any event, to hold that good cause is supported 
by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the 
prosecutor would contradict the language in section 
77-29-1(4) which places the burden of complying 
with the statute on the prosecution. 
FN21. See State v. Sailings, 709 P.2d 348, 349 
(Utah 1985) (concerning the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 
(Supp.1984)); State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 
(Utah 1985), State v. Trujillo, 656 P 2d 403, 405 
(Utah 1982) (per curiam), State v. Velasquez, 641 
P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). 
FN22. See State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 
P.2d 158, 159-60 (1969). Although Wilson was 
decided under the previous statute, as noted above 
the standard for allowing a case to be tried beyond 
the required time, good cause, is the same under 
both statutes. 
FN23 State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d at 349; State v. 
Bullock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v. Velasquez, 641 
P.2dat 116. 
FN24 State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v. 
Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405. 
[9] It is necessary, therefore, to examine the trial 
court's conclusion that the delay was reasonable 
because it was for the specific purpose of allowing 
defendant and his counsel time to resolve their 
conflicts. In some circumstances, conflicts between 
defendants and their counsel may justify delay. It is 
to be noted, however, that in the instant case the 
trial court became aware of the problems 57 days 
after the notice of disposition was filed. Arguably, 
this problem could have been resolved within the 
time allotted by the statute. Indeed, a review of the 
record makes it clear that the trial judge did not feel 
that such a delay was necessary. When Petersen's 
counsel, due to continuing conflicts, sought to 
withdraw 34 days prior to trial, the court denied the 
motion, appointed co-counsel, and did not continue 
the trial. In the order appointing co-counsel, the 
court stated that it did "not wish to delay the trial 
because of any such conflict." Since a delay was not 
necessary to resolve the conflict 34 days before the 
date of trial, a fortiori, a delay was not necessary to 
resolve the conflict approximately 63 days before 
the running of the statutory period. [FN25] 
FN25. The statute requires that a defendant be tried 
within 120 days of the time the notice is delivered, 
not filed. See § 77-29-1(1); see also State v. 
Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 312-13 (Utah 1975) (dealing 
with section 77-65-2). Since the record does not 
reveal when the notice of disposition was delivered 
to the county attorney, it is impossible to determine 
the exact date the statutory period ran. However, 
nothing in the record indicates that the notice of 
disposition was not delivered within a reasonable 
time as required by the statute. See § 77-29-1(2), 
see also State v Taylor, 538 P.2d at 312-13 
•427 It should also be noted that there was a long 
delay inasmuch as the trial date was set for 218 days 
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of 
disposition. Given the fact that the record reveals 
that the trial court felt the delay was unnecessary, 
such a long delay cannot be considered reasonable. 
The conclusion that the delay was for the purpose of 
allowing time for defendant and his counsel to 
resolve their conflicts, therefore, cannot be used to 
support a reasonable basis for the finding of good 
cause. 
The State contends that in State v. Bullock, 
[FN26] this court upheld a finding of good cause 
under similar facts. Bullock, however, is easily 
distinguishable from the instant case. First, in 
Bullock the defense counsel moved for a 
continuance because he was ill on the date of trial. 
[FN27] In the instant case, there was no motion for 
a continuance and the conflict did not arise shortly 
before trial. Second, in Bullock the continuance 
only delayed the trial 13 days beyond the original 
trial date. [FN28] In the instant case, the trial was 
delayed over 90 days from the running of the 
statutory period. A review of the proceeding, 
therefore, does not reveal a reasonable basis for the 
finding of good cause. Accordingly, pursuant to 
section 77-29-1, Petersen's convictions should be 
reversed and the charges against him dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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FN26. 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985). 
FN27. Id. at 756. 
FN28. Id. In Bullock, there was no record of the 
delivery of the notice of disposition. Therefore, it 
is impossible to determine how much time passed 
between the delivery of the notice and the trial. 
Due to our holding regarding section 77-29-1, we 
do not reach the other issues in the case. However, 
we feel compelled to again comment on the 
propriety of trial judges' presiding over criminal 
trials when they have previously prosecuted the 
defendants. In State v. Neeley, [FN29] a case that 
also dealt with a judge who presided over a trial of a 
defendant whom he had previously prosecuted, we 
stated: 
FN29. 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988). 
[A] judge should recuse himself when his 
"impartiality" might reasonably be questioned. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C)(1)(b) (1981). 
This standard set forth by the Code of Judicial 
Conduct should be given careful consideration by 
the trial judge. It may require recusal in instances 
where no actual bias is shown.... [T]he integrity 
of the judicial system should be protected against 
any taint of suspicion.... [W]e recommend the 
practice that a judge recuse himself where there is 
a colorable claim of bias or prejudice.... [FN30] 
FN30. Id. at 1094 (emphasis in original). 
We went on to hold that although judges should 
recuse themselves if there are colorable claims of 
bias or prejudice, absent a showing of actual bias, 
"failure to do so does not constitute reversible error 
as long as the requirements of section 77-35-29 
[current version at Utah R.Crim.P. 29] have been 
met." [FN31] 
FN31. Id. at 1094-95. 
The instant case, however, is more troubling than 
Neeley. In this case, the trial judge, upon receiving 
the affidavit alleging prejudice, did not have a 
second judge rule on the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit as required by rule 29(d), but summarily 
dismissed the motion on the ground that it was 
untimely. We are aware of the problems that arise 
when motions to disqualify are filed the day of trial 
and stress that we are not deciding the issue of 
whether the requirements of rule 29 must be 
complied with under such circumstances. However, 
because the motion to disqualify was summarily 
dismissed, we are without a record sufficient to 
enable us to determine whether the affidavit was 
filed "as soon as practical" and "in good faith" as 
required by rule 29(c). It is also to be observed 
that, assuming the trial judge was aware of his prior 
contact with Petersen, the problem could have been 
avoided had the judge followed our recommendation 
in Neeley and, *428 on his own motion, recused 
himself due to the colorable claim of prejudice. 
Pursuant to our holding regarding section 77-29-
1, the convictions are reversed and the charges are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
HOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
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